

~~TOP SECRET~~

USSR

Ref. No: 3/NBF/T261 (of 3/11/1952)

Issued: 15/4/1960

Copy No: 201

RE-ISSUE

MOSCOW'S OBSERVATIONS ON GUZENKO'S DEFECTION AND INSTRUCTIONS  
TO RESIDENTS FOR TIGHTENING SECURITY (1946)

From: MOSCOW

To: CANBERRA

No: 76

7 April 46

To be deciphered personally by the RESIDENT [REZIDENT]. [1]

As you know from the press, [B% the former] [2 groups unrecovered] cipher clerk of the RESIDENCY of the Chief Intelligence Directorate [REZIDENTURA GRU] of the Red Army in CANADA - GUZENKO [,] has betrayed our country.

GUZENKO stole and passed to the Canadian authorities several dozen incoming and outgoing cipher telegrams, personal dossiers on a valuable [B% agent network] [13 groups unrecovered] [B% agent network and] operational work in the NEIGHBOURS' RESIDENCY [REZIDENTURA SOSEDEJ] [11] in CANADA was so organised that each operational worker had a detailed knowledge of the work of other members of the staff, the agent network, the times and places of meetings, the nature of the tasks of the CENTRE [TsENTR], and plans for operational [B% measures]. In the RESIDENCY personal dossiers on the agent network became common knowledge.

In the work of the agent network extensive use was made of members of the FELLOW COUNTRYMEN's [111] organisation [ZEMLYACHESKAYA ORGANIZATSIYA] who were known to the authorities of the country for their progressive activity. Thus, GUZENKO's work as a cipher clerk on the Headquarters staff [TsENTRAL'NYJ APPARAT], and afterwards in the same post at the RESIDENCY (where a decline in vigilance gave rise to the situation described), made it possible for the traitor to have at his disposal State secrets of great importance. G.'s testimony, and a number of documents introduced by the prosecution at the hearing, show that G. himself was preparing to betray his country long before the day on which he defected.

Distribution

[Continued overleaf]

In the RESIDENCY there was no study or training [VOSPITANIE] of people, the most elementary principles of security [KONSPIRATSIYA] were ignored, complacency and self-satisfaction went unchecked. All this was the result of a decline in political vigilance and sense of responsibility for work entrusted by the Party and the Government.

G.'s defection has caused great damage to our country and has, in particular, very greatly complicated our work in the American countries. It is essential [D% for us] to draw the appropriate conclusions from this fact.

In the instructions which we are sending you by the next post, rules and regulations are given for ensuring security [KONSPIRATSIYA] in the work and for fostering in our comrades the qualities of party vigilance and discipline. You are directed to observe these rules and regulations scrupulously, applying them everywhere in actual practice. Without waiting for the receipt of the instructions, ascertain how matters stand in your RESIDENCY. Take all necessary measures to improve the organization of all agent network and operational work [AGENTURNO-OPERATIVNAYA RABOTA], paying special attention to tightening security. The work must be organized so that each member of the staff and agent can have no knowledge of our work beyond what directly relates to the task which he is carrying out. Telegraph concerning what steps you have taken. Confirm the receipt of this telegram.

No. 304

PETROV[iv]

Comments: [i] This text was also sent to ALGIERS (external serial number 51), COPENHAGEN (No. 173), HAGUE (No. 111), HAVANA (No. 57), MEXICO CITY (No. 198), NEW YORK (No. 383), WASHINGTON (No. 711), and (on national links, with no external serial number) to BRUSSELS, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, PARIS and ZAGREB, and also on four unidentified lanes. The MEXICO CITY message has contributed to the solution of further text.

[ii] NEIGHBOURS: Members of another Soviet intelligence organization.

[iii] FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN: Members of the Communist Party.

[iv] PETROV : Unidentified cover-name. (Identified as BERIYA)